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INCREASING CONSUMER POWER IN THE GRIEVANCE AND
APPEAL PROCESS FOR MEDICARE HMO ENROLLEES
Kenneth J. Pippin*
Federal law requires that Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) provide Medicare beneficiaries with spe-
cific grievance and appeal rights for challenging adverse decisions of these
organizations. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is charged
with enforcing these regulations. Currently, however, HCFA contracts with
HMOs, allowing them to enroll Medicare beneficiaries despite the fact that many
of the statutory and regulatory requirements are ignored by the Medicare HMOs.
This is problematic because the elderly Medicare population may not be able to in-
dependently and adequately challenge the HMO's denial of care or reimbursement.
Because HCFA has been reluctant and ineffective in ensuring that Medicare en-
rollees are guaranteed grievance and appeal rights, other alternatives should be
explored. This Note argues that private accreditation, for those Medicare HMOs
that choose to be subjected to the process, should be allowed as an alternative to
regulation under HCFA.
"The... [grievance and appeal process] used by the HMOs hides the
ball. "
Increasing numbers of the elderly are enrolling in Medicare
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or other Competitive
Medical Plans (CMPs)' rather than the traditional fee-for-service
Medicare program. In 1993, there were 2.1 million Medicare bene-
ficiaries enrolled in HMOs, totaling 6% of the Medicare
population. By 1999, the number of Medicare recipients enrolled
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. A.B. 1994, Duke
University; M.Sc. 1996, University of Toronto; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan Law School.
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1. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 758 (D. Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th
Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999) (emphasis added).
2. This Note uses the term "Health Maintenance Organization" (HMO) to refer to
any managed care plan or organization that operates on a capitated fee basis regardless of
form. Managed Care Organization (MCO) is the general term often used by commentators,
but statutes and regulations very often refer to HMOs and this Note does similarly. The term
HMO includes both risk- and cost-based HMOs. Capitated fee plans receive a capitated dol-
lar fee per enrollee. Cost-based HMOs receive the reasonable costs of their expenses. If
expenditures are less than the total amount of fees, then the plan profits the excess. If ex-
penditures are greater, then the plan, or possibly the enrollees, must provide for that
shortfall. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1994) (providing greater specificity on various plans).
3. See Dana Shilling, Pitfalls and Advantages of Medicare HMOs, National Underwriter
(visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http://www.nunews.com/archives/lh-archive/1997/104-14/
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform V
in HMOs increased to seven million or 17% of the Medicare popu-
lation. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provides further
incentives for Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in HMOs! The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that in four years 25% of all
Medicare beneficiaries will be enrolled in HMOs.6 Often HMOs are
attractive to both the beneficiaries, because they receive benefits
beyond those provided by the fee-for-service Medicare option,7 and
the U.S. government, because HMOs provide care to the enrollees
on a capitated basis, resulting in lower expenditures for the public
Medicare program."
There is a concern among health care observers, however, that
because HMOs receive capitated payments for their enrollees and
have an interest in maximizing profits, HMOs have incentives to
reduce the number of services provided and to supply inferior
care.' One way to address this concern is to design and implement
a functioning grievance and appeal mechanism for HMO enrollees
who believe they have been denied medically necessary services
0015dsck.asp> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The discussion
in this Note focuses on the elderly, those people aged sixty-five years and older who there-
fore are covered by Medicare. Although other individuals, including the disabled, may be
covered by the Medicare program, the elderly comprise an overwhelming majority of Medi-
care recipients.
4. See Laurie McGinley, Medicare HMOs Provide Fawed Data to Elderly, Capital Hill
Agency Says, WALL ST.J., Apr. 13, 1999, at A4.
5. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 1851, 111 Stat. 251 (creating
the Medicare+Choice plan, a newly defined type of Medicare program based on managed
care).
6. See American Association of Retired Persons, New AARP Study Shows Medicare Benefi-
ciaries Know Little About HMOs, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.aarp.org/press/
1998/nr061898.html> [hereinafter AARP] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) (quoting Theresa Varner, Director, Public Policy Institute, American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons).
7. See Peter D. Fox & Teresa Fama, Managed Care and the Elderly: Performance and Poten-
tia; 20 GENERATIONS 31, 33 (1996) (stating that Medicare HMOs often save enrollees
money and provide "imaginative services... that Medicare would not normally pay for").
Examples include screenings for chronic illness to promote early intervention, providing
more extensive primary care to reduce emergency room and hospital visits, arranging trans-
portation programs for people with mobility problems and altering the home environment
to reduce the risk of falls. See id.
8. See Pi-Yi Mayo, Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 25, 26
(1997). Under the traditional fee-for-service model, there is no limit to the number of serv-
ices Medicare beneficiaries can receive and accordingly no limit to the amount of money the
Medicare program may spend. Under the Medicare HMO model, the Medicare program
pays a fixed amount to the Medicare HMO for each Medicare HMO enrollee. Generally, the
budget is fixed regardless of how many services are provided to the enrollees. See id. at 27-
28.
9. See id. at 28-29 ("[A] possible desire on the part of an HMO to spend as little per
enrollee in order to turn a profit.., causes some advocates to be concerned that health care
decisions may be made on the basis of economics rather than on the beneficiary's health
care needs.").
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that have been purportedly guaranteed under the Medicare pro-
gram or their HMO's plan."° Currently, Medicare HMO enrollees
may exit their plan at any time, but beginning in 2002 under the
Medicare+Choice Program, which is an expansion of managed
care in the Medicare program, they must wait six months before
disenrolling; this waiting period will increase to nine months start-
ing in 2003." As the waiting period to disenroll from Medicare
HMOs grows longer, a meaningful grievance and appeal process
will become more important to the beneficiaries because it will be
one of the few ways an enrollee can advance his right to receive
care or protest poor treatment.
As a condition of payment from the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA), which administers Medicare, an HMO must
show that its plan "provide[s] meaningful procedures for hearing
and resolving grievances between the organization ... and mem-
bers enrolled with the organization under [the Medicare
Program] . Unfortunately, under the current system of enforce-
ment, HMOs often fail to provide meaningful grievance and
appeal processes." Furthermore, HCFA has done little to sanction
these non-compliant HMOs. 4
For example, in 1992, HCFA found a California HMO to have
breached the requirement to provide adequate notice to enrol-
lees." In 1994, the violations were still taking place. 6 After a review
of the case, HCFA observed that the HMO lacked the time and
10. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 5 (1994) (statement of Bente Cooney,
Coalition for Consumer Protection and Quality in Health Care Reform) ("[A]ccess to an
independent and timely appeals process is critical to maintaining quality care for consum-
ers."); Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposals, and
Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L REv. 1319, 1372 (1996) ("Consumer voice can be fostered in [HMOs]
through organizational governance and through grievance and complaint processes."); John
Rother, Consumer Protection in Managed Care: A Third-Generation Approach, 20 GENERATIONS 42,
42 (1996) ("[T]here is a compelling need to establish appeals mechanisms that can resolve
denial-of-treatment problems quickly and fairly."); Warren I. Wolfe, Easing Dispute Resolution:
When HMOs Don't Have a Fair Process for Settling Fights, It Hurts Quality at All Levels, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 8, 1997, at 38; Medicare: Urgent Patient Appeals Must Be Resolved Quickly,
American Health Line, Apr. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, Medical & Healthcare Library,
ALLNEWS file (quoting Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services:
"Consumers should have the right to a speedy ruling in cases where time may be crucial....
[It] will help assure the rights of patients come first.").
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c) (5) (A) (1994); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a) (2) (i) (1999).
("An HMO or CMP must establish grievance and appeals procedures.").
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-95-155, MEDICARE: IN-
CREASED HMO OVERSIGHT COULD IMPROVE QUALITY AND ACCESS TO CARE 13 (1995).
16. See id.
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resources to implement the grievance and appeal rules. 7 This in-
ability directly conflicts with the statute, which requires every
Medicare HMO to have a meaningful grievance and appeal proc-
ess. "'8 HCFA found that in 62% of reviewed cases the California
HMO failed to forward appeals for redeterminations to HCFA
within the sixty day administrative requirement.' 9 Even though
HCFA found the HMO committed numerous violations and the
HMO issued only corrective action plans on paper with few
changes in its administration, HCFA nevertheless approved the
Medicare contract each time, despite the HMO's non-compliance
with the statute and the regulations.20 During this time the HMO
tripled its Medicare membership even though beneficiaries did not
receive their appeal rights.
2 1
This example demonstrates HCFA's failure to ensure that the
vulnerable population of Medicare HMO enrollees has access to a
functioning grievance and appeal process.22 Because the grievance
and appeal process is potentially an enrollee's strongest tool in
dealing with his HMO, the process needs to be effective. Because
HCFA does not enforce these regulations adequately, the Medicare
HMO enrollee is at a disadvantage in filing complaints and ad-
dressing denials of his care. Therefore, other methods of
regulation should be explored. Private accreditation of Medicare
HMOs as an alternative to HCFA approval is one way to protect
consumers and provide them with better information on Medicare
HMOs.
This Note argues that the U.S. Congress and the Department of
Health and Human Services should allow Medicare HMOs to seek
voluntary accreditation from government-certified private organi-
zations in lieu of direct government regulation of their internal
grievance and appeal processes. Voluntary accreditation would im-
prove HMO efficiency and provide more information to Medicare
enrollees. Part I of this Note provides an overview of the current
Medicare HMO grievance and appeal process. Part II describes the
behavior of the elderly as health care consumers. Part III describes
how the current lack of enforcement of government regulations
17. See id.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (c)(5)(A) (1994).
19. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 13. A redetermination is a
request by an enrollee to the HMO to reconsider a decision to deny a type of treatment or
other medical decision. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.614 (1999).
20. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 13.
21. See id.
22. See infra Part II.B (providing numerous examples of HCFA's failure to enforce the
grievance and appeal requirements for Medicare HMOs).
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results in the need for alternate forms of regulation in the area of
grievance and appeal. Part IV proposes solutions that strengthen
the grievance and appeal process for Medicare HMO enrollees.
Part V explains how voluntary private accreditation of an HMO's
grievance and appeal process would operate and concludes that,
among the available choices, a voluntary private accreditation
mechanism would best inform and protect Medicare HMO enrol-
lees.
I. CURRENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
GOVERNING THE PROCESS OF GRIEVANCE AND
APPEAL FOR MEDICARE HMOs
For an HMO to enroll Medicare beneficiaries and receive pay-
ment from HCFA, the HMO must "provide meaningful procedures
for hearing and resolving grievances between the organization...
and members enrolled with the organization under [the Medicare
Program] .23 Enrollees may challenge an HMO decision if they are
"dissatisfied because they do not receive health care services to
which they believe they are entitled, at no greater cost than they
believe they are required to pay."2 4 The HMO must establish pro-
cedures for appeals, which allow enrollees to dispute specific
determinations by the HMO, and grievances, which facilitate enrol-
lees' general complaints.5 If an HMO does not comply with these
requirements, HCFA can terminate its Medicare contract 26 or im-
pose civil fines.2' To explain the current grievance and appeal
process, a brief explanation of the terms used throughout follows.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(A) (1994); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.142 (1999) (listing
the qualification requirements for HMOs); 42 C.F.R. § 417.408 (1999) (describing the con-
tract application process for HMOs); 42 C.F.R. § 417 .600(a)(2)(i) (1999) ("An HMO ...
must establish grievance and appeals procedures.").
24. 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a) (2) (ii) (1999).
25. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.604(a)(1) (1999). Grievances are general complaints about
HMO services that "do not involve organization determinations." 42 C.F.R. § 417.604(a) (ii)
(1999). An appeal is an enrollee's attempt to overturn an HMO's adverse determination. See
42 C.F.R. § 417.600(b) (1) (1999).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(1) (1994). For a Medicare HMO to receive funding
from the Medicare program and enroll Medicare beneficiaries, HCFA must contract with
the individual Medicare HMO. See42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(a) (1994).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i) (6) (B) (1994) (describing HCFA sanctions); see also 42
C.F.R. § 417.500 (1999).
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An organization determination is a determination by an HMO
regarding any medical treatment. Organization determinations
may be appealed.2 For example, a Medicare enrollee may appeal
an HMO's denial of any type of treatment, such as a specific medi-
cal procedure, a hospital stay, or a specialist visit. If an organization
determination conflicts with the preferences of the Medicare en-
rollee, it is characterized as being "adverse."3
A grievance is defined as a challenge to a "determination that is
not an organization determination."31 If, for example, a Medicare
enrollee wanted to challenge the method of filing claims with the
HMO because it is time-consuming and delays reimbursement, the
challenge would be considered a grievance because the HMO did
not make an adverse organization determination with respect to
the enrollee.
The HMO must "ensure that all enrollees receive written infor-
mation about the grievance and appeals procedures ... available
... to them."32 This information must detail a beneficiary's griev-
ance and appeal rights, the circumstances required for expedited
review, the actions required by the beneficiary, and the time limits
for each stage of review. The HMO must also provide information
explaining how the enrollee may activate the independent Peer
Review Organizations (PROs) that review the appropriateness of
hospital discharges under the Medicare program.34
If an HMO makes an adverse organization determination re-
garding an enrollee, the HMO must notify the enrollee within sixty
28. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.606(a) (1)-(4) (1999). This includes "[p]ayment for emergency
or urgently needed services," any other services furnished by a provider other than the
HMO that the "enrollee believes [a]re covered under Medicare; and [s]hould have been
furnished, arranged for, or reimbursed by the HMO," the refusal of services that the enrol-
lee believes should be furnished by the HMO, and discontinuation of a service, such as
skilled nursing care, that the enrollee believes should be continued. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.606(b) (1999) (defining actions that do not qualify as HMO determinations as deter-
minations regarding services that were furnished by the HMO for which the enrollee has no
obligations and those subject to a grievance procedure as defined in 42 C.F.R. § 416.606
(1999)).
29. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a) (2) (ii) (1999).
30. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.608(a) (1999) (stating that an HMO must provide notice to an
enrollee when it makes an organization determination that is partially or fully adverse to the
enrollee).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 417.606(c) (1999) (explaining that grievances are defined in terms of
not rising to the level of organization determinations).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 417.604(a)(2) (1999) (implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(3) (E) (v)
(1994)).
33. See42 C.F.R. § 417.600(b) (3) (ii) (1999).
34. See42 C.F.R. § 417.600(b)(4) (1999); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.605 (1999)
(describing the immediate PRO process through which a determination of non-coverage for
inpatient hospital care is reviewed by a special committee of physicians that evaluates the
care plan and its appropriateness).
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days of its receipt of the enrollee's request for care or the provision
of services. 5 Failure to provide timely notice constitutes an adverse
organization determination and may be appealed automatically.
36
The notice must include "the specific reasons for the [adverse or-
ganization] determinations" and must "[i]nform the enrollee of
his or her right to a reconsideration [of an adverse organization
determination], including the right to and conditions for obtain-
ing an expedited [reconsideration by the HMO]."3
An expedited reconsideration8 is allowed only if the organiza-
tion determination "could seriously jeopardize the life or health of
the enrollee or the enrollee's ability to regain maximum func-
tion."39 The HMO must notify the enrollee, and the physician if
appropriate, of the outcome of the reconsideration. This must be
done within seventy-two hours of the enrollee's request, but an ex-
tension can be made by the HMO for ten working days if the HMO
determines that additional information is necessary and the delay
is not injurious to the enrollee's interests.0 The HMO must pro-
vide the appellee a "reasonable opportunity to present evidence
and allegations of fact or law, related to the issue in dispute, in per-
son as well as in writing."
41
Once an enrollee has exhausted the HMO's internal procedure
of appeals for adverse determinations, he may turn to the existing
appeal procedures provided under the Medicare program.42 If after
this review the HMO partially or wholly affirms the adverse
35. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.608(a)(1) (1999).
36. See42 C.F.R. § 417.608(c) (1999).
37. 42 C.F.R. § 417.608(b) (1999); see also 42 C.F.1. § 417.616 (1999) (describing how
an individual may seek reconsideration of an adverse organization determination of the
HMO).
38. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.609 (1999). The Medicare HMO enrollee may request the re-
view either in writing or orally. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.609(a).
39. 42 C.F.R. § 417.609(b) (1999) (stating that the HMO decides which determina-
tions fall into this category).
40. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.609(c) (3) (1999).
41. 42 C.F.R. § 417.618 (1999).
42. See 42. U.S.C. § 1395mm(c) (5) (B) (1994) (applying procedures under § 405(g) of
the Social Security Act to service denials by HMOs); see also HCFA, Department of Health and
Human Services, Operational Policy Letter #81 (OPL99.081) (last modified Feb. 19, 1999)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/opl081.html> [hereinafter HCFA, Operational Policy Letter]
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing requirements for
appeals and public reporting requirements of appeals under the Medicare+Choice pro-
gram); HCFA, Program Memorandum: Implementation of the Expedited Appeal Regulation (last
modified May 4, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/xappeal.HTM> (showing the time
table for both standard 60-day appeals and expedited 72-hour appeals). These regulations
followed a class action suit to implement effective grievance and appeals regulations for
Medicare HMOs. See infra Part I11A; Maria A. Morrison, The Impact of Grijalva v. Shalala on
the Medicare HMO Appeal Process and the Importance of Enforcing Appeal Process Regulations, 103
DICK. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1999).
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organization determination, it must explain that decision in writ-
ing to HCFA, "3 which contracts with an independent group, the
Center for Health Dispute Resolution (CHDR), to review the
HMO's determinations."
After this process concludes, an enrollee who is still dissatisfied
has the right to a hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) . Any party to the ALJ hearing may appeal to the Depart-
mental Appeals Board (DAB)6 to review the ALJ's decision or
dismissal.4 ' Finally, the enrollee has the right to judicial review in
federal district court if the amount in controversy exceeds $1000.48
The structure of the grievance and appeal process for Medicare
HMOs can be confusing to enrollees. HCFA's lack of enforcement
of existing regulations further diminishes the power of the elderly
consumer. When structuring a new regulatory method, it is impor-
tant to consider the actual behavior of and problems faced by older
Americans in the health care marketplace. Part II examines these
issues.
II. ELDERLY HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS FACE INFORMATION
PROBLEMS WHEN INTERACTING WITH HMOs
The characteristics of Medicare enrollees, especially as they dif-
fer from the entire population of health care consumers, affect the
success of the Medicare grievance and appeal system. Although
Congress created the Medicare program in the 1960s, the intro-
duction of managed care often makes evaluation of and access to
HMOs difficult. This Part reviews how Medicare beneficiaries un-
43. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.620(b) (1999).
44. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. T-HEHS-00-108, MEDI-
CARE+CHOICE: HCFA ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE BENEFIT AND APPEAL INFORMATION 4 (1999)
[hereinafter Scanlon] (statement of William J. Scanlon, Director of Health Financing and
Public Health Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, General Accounting
Office before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, Apr. 13, 1999). The CHDR, a
private organization, has a contract with HCFA to review the cases that are forwarded to
HCFA. Previously HCFA contracted with the Network Design Group (NDG).
45. See 42 C.F.R. §417.600(a)(2)(ii)(A) (1999); 42 C.F.R. §417.630 (1999). The
amount in controversy must be $100 or greater and a request must be filed within 60 days of
the notice of the determination. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a) (2) (ii) (A); 42 C.F.R. § 417.630.
46. The Departmental Appeals Board is an administrative body originally established
under the Social Security Act and has been utilized in resolving disputes under Medicare. See
Procedures of the Departmental Appeals Board, 45 C.F.R. § 16 app. A (1997).
47. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.634 (1999) (stating that any party that is dissatisfied with the de-
termination may appeal to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council to review the
DAB's decision).
48. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a) (2) (ii) (B) (1999); 42 C.F.R. § 417.636 (1999).
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derstand their health care options and how they perceive their
rights when enrolled in HMOs. Part II.A reviews the characteristics
and knowledge of Medicare beneficiaries. Part IIB discusses the
difficulties Medicare HMO enrollees experience in advancing their
interests once they have joined an HMO.
A. Characteristics and Knowledge of Medicare Beneficiaries
Consumers have difficulty in assessing managed health care
plans.49 One commentator wrote, "[c]onsumers are and will remain
technically unable to assess, unguided, the relative quality [and
availability of medical care] .,,50 This is particularly true with respect
to the elderly enrollee. 51 A study released by the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons (AARP) found that 89% of Medicare
beneficiaries did not have enough knowledge to make an informed
choice between traditional fee-for-service Medicare and Medicare
HMOs in areas of high geographic concentration of managed care
options.
Similarly, in another survey consisting of half Medicare HMO
enrollees and half Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, only 11%
of those surveyed had adequate knowledge (scores of 76% or
higher on a set of questions) to choose between traditional Medi-
care and an HMO.53 More than 59% of those surveyed fell in the
"inadequate" range (scores of 50% or less) . Finally, 11% scored in
55the lowest quartile. Those who scored in the lowest quartile were
more often female and enrolled in an HMO, used fewer informa-
tion sources, had less education, and had a lower income level
than those in the highest quartile. 6
These statistics raise concerns about whether the elderly have a
diminished ability to advocate for themselves against the corporate
49. SeeJudith H. Hibbard & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consum-
ers?, HEALTH Aer., May-June 1997, at 218; John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health
Care Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 707 (1997).
50. Jacobi, supra note 49, at 707.
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. See AARP, supra note 6 (stating that when they make choices about whether to join
an HMO, the elderly often are inadequately informed and, for example, often do not un-
derstand which services an HMO would cover).
53. See Judith H. Hibbard et al., Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed Choices?,
HEALTH Aen., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 186.
54. See id.
55. See id. (stating that those who scored in this category answered fewer questions cor-
rectly than had they guessed).
56. See id.
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HMO. The authors of the survey stated, "[i] t appears that those...
who used information from consumer groups and newspapers or
magazines had significantly higher knowledge scores than those
who did not use these sources."57 Information is difficult to obtain,
especially because "[flew, if any enrollees routinely read the Fed-
eral Register for noncompliance notices [of an HMO's failure to
comply with certain regulations], and revocation of an HMO's fed-
eral qualification is rare." 8 The information problems related to
assessing the quality of HMOs indicate the need for measures
aimed at protecting the elderly consumer.
Suspiciously, regardless of what type of Medicare coverage bene-
ficiaries choose all of the respondents reported satisfaction with
their health care services.59 One study concluded, "[Medicare]
HMO enrollees were significantly more likely than nonenrollees
were to be very satisfied with the costs of care and with getting all
of their care at one location."6° However, the authors pointed out
that even though Medicare beneficiaries are generally satisfied with
the care they receive, the high percentage of satisfied enrollees
could be due to dissatisfied enrollees deciding to exercise their
ability to disenroll, returning to the fee-for-service option.6 ' This
observation may be further reinforced by the study's finding that
HMO enrollees were less likely than those in Medicare fee-for-
service programs to strongly agree with positive statements about
62their care.
In a review of several surveys of Medicare beneficiaries, the
authors evaluated a National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)
study.63 They found that their own research was consistent with
data from Medicare focus groups conducted in the past five years.64
Throughout the studies, "beneficiaries ... had difficulty under-
standing or comparing the plan options available to them."65 Also,
"there was a widespread perception, reflected in all of the sessions
57. Id.
58. Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations: To-
ward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1674, 1702 n.201
(1994).
59. See Cynthia G. Tudor et. al., Satisfaction with Care: Do Medicare HMOs Make a Differ-
ence?, HEALTH Asr., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 165, 166.
60. Id. at 170.
61. See id. at 174.
62. See id. at 173.
63. SeeJill Bernstein & Rosemary A. Stevens, Public Opinion, Knowledge and Medicare Re-
form, HEALTH Ae.,Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 180, 181.
64. See id. at 184.
65. Id.
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with seniors, that when beneficiaries enroll in a Medicare managed
care plan, they are no longer 'in Medicare.' "
B. Medicare HMO Enrollees Face Problems in Asserting Their Rights
Under the Current Grievance and Appeal Process
Various characteristics of Medicare HMO enrollees, including,
for example, their lower incomes, raise concerns about their ability
to advocate for themselves when an HMO makes a determination
that is adverse to their interests. The regulatory structure govern-
ing how HMOs design their grievance and appeal process should
account for this problem. Unfortunately, the current regulations
have not been sensitive to some of the particular vulnerabilities of
Medicare enrollees.
The information problems for Medicare beneficiaries persist
once they enroll in an HMO, particularly with respect to the griev-
ance and appeal process. One survey found that many elderly
Medicare HMO enrollees were unaware that the Medicare griev-
ance and appeal process continued to apply to them after they
joined an HMO.6' Several participants believed incorrectly that
"'when you join a health plan, you are no longer in Medicare, and
you can't change plans for a year.' "6 One quarter of the benefici-
aries in a government study did not know they had the right to
appeal their HMO's refusal to provide or pay for services. 69 This is
consistent with the study discussed earlier that found appeal rights
were poorly understood.70
Unfortunately, those in fair or poor health and the oldest eld-
erly are much more likely than the general population to report
access problems in Medicare HMOs, including difficulties in pro-
testing adverse organization determinations.7' Congress, in
enacting and amending the Medicare Act, "has repeatedly recog-
nized that the elderly, as a group, are less able than the general
population to deal effectively with legal notices and written
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERV-
ICES, PUB. No. OEI-06-91-00730, BENEFICIARY PERSPECTIVES OF MEDICARE RISK HMOs, at ii
(1995).
70. See Hibbard et al., supra note 53; see also Bernstein & Stevens, supra note 63.
71. See Lyle Nelson et al., Access to Care in Medicare HMOs 1996, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 1997, at 148, 151.
Increasing Consumer Power
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
registration requirements."72 In a review of several social science
studies, Marc A. Rodwin wrote, "[d]ue process standards assume
that consumers will use grievance processes, if available. Individual
consumers, however, often lack the resources, the stamina, or the
inclination to do so.
73
One of the consequences of Medicare beneficiaries' inability to
advocate strongly on their own behalf is that they disenroll from
Medicare HMOs at a significant rate. Statistics show that a substan-
tial number of Medicare HMO enrollees return to Medicare's fee-
for-service option.4 By one national sample, 16% of the elderly in
Medicare HMOs cease to be members of an HMO in any given
year.7 5 The General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that
Medicare HMO enrollees disenroll from HMOs at greater ratesthanthe enerl . 76
than thegeneral population. Disenrollment may be indicative of
dissatisfaction with care and frustration in advancing their claims
against HMOs.
Further statistics provide insight on how Medicare HMO enrol-
lees currently appeal adverse determinations made by their HMO.
The Network Design Group (NDG) and the CHDR compile statis-
tics on the number and type of appeals filed by enrollees. 77 "NDG
resolved almost 2500 of 3704 reconsiderations filed during 1992." 78
NDG reported that between 1989 and 1992 the number of recon-
siderations increased from 1.7 to 2.2 cases per 1000 enrollees; this
was faster than the enrollment growth rate.79 In 1996, CHDR re-
viewed reconsiderations of decisions by Medicare HMOs.s8 Only
the plans with at least 1000 enrollees were considered in the re-
view.81  On average, only 1.1% of enrollees requested
reconsideration of adverse organization determinations.2 Very few
Medicare enrollees exercised their right to advance an appeal.
72. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (referring to S.
Rep. No. 92-1230, at 38 (1972)).
73. Rodwin, supra note 10, at 1347 (citing scientific studies of consumers fearing repri-
sal from providers and showing that consumers do not know the appeal procedures).
74. See infta notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
75. See Fox & Fama, supra note 7, at 33.
76. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that in 1991
42% of Medicare enrollees disenrolled from their HMOs within two years following a dis-
pute over covered services, and, of those, 63% disenrolled 90 days after their cases were
decided by HCFA).
77. See Scanlon, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
78. Stayn, supra note 58, at 1696 n.150.
79. See id.
80. See Perspective: Medicare HMO Appeals Process Becomes Top Concern for HCFA, Consum-
ers, MANAGED MEDICARE & MEDICAID, Aug. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9411384.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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Of all the NDG decisions, 58% supported the HMO, 8% of the
appeals were withdrawn, and 33% were successful. 83 A minority of
the appeals were resolved in favor of the Medicare enrollee. Of the
successful appeals, 60% completely overturned the HMO's adverse
determination, 15% partially overturned the adverse determina-
tion, and 24% resulted in the enrollee's retroactive disenrollment
from the HMO, which shifted the responsibility for payment to the
Medicare fee-for-service program.84 Nearly 60% of all sampled cases
involved disputes over emergency or urgent services.5 In 1992, ap-
peals most commonly concerned HMO denial of payment for
treatment by outside providers (many cases arose when there were
long delays for specialists); emergency care; and unauthorized in-
patient care. 86 The mean value per claim for cases processed in
1992 was $900 for treatment by an outside doctor, $680 for emer-
gency care, and $11,998 for inpatient care.81 The cost of these
services may discourage the enrollees from personally incurring
them and thus results in inadequate care. There were very few ap-
peals for reconsideration of adverse organization determinations
of HMOs by enrollees. One commentator has suggested:
[O]ne reason that the appeal system may not be serving as ef-
fective a deterrent purpose as it might is that more than one-
third of Medicare HMOs report no reconsideration requests.
While it is possible that outstanding performance explains the
lack of any appeals in these plans, a perhaps more plausible
explanation is that enrollees are poorly informed of appeal
rights and procedures."'
More recent data, based on the 4552 reconsiderations reviewed
by CHDR, shows that 65.5% of the reconsiderations were upheld
and 28.5% were overturned. 89 The remaining 6% were either par-
tially overturned or reconsideration was not completed because the
person disenrolled.9° Reconsiderations based on nonpayment of
care (when the enrollee received care from a provider outside the
83. See Stayn, supra note 58, at 1696 n.15O.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1697-99 (citing Network Design Group, Inc. Annual Report 1992, Con-
tract No. 500-92-0004).
87. See id. at 1697 n.159.
88. Id. at 1696 n.152 (citation omitted).
89. See Perspective: Medicare HMO Appeals Process Becomes Top Concern for HCFA, Consum-
ers, supra note 80.
90. See id.
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network) were upheld in 66.6% of the cases in 1996.9' Reconsidera-
tions based on denials of coverage for inpatient hospital care were
overturned in 43.2% of all cases in favor of the enrollee.92 A Medi-
care HMO enrollee typically will not advance an appeal for the
denial of a certain treatment or medical expense. Enrollees who do
advance claims will likely be unsuccessful.
The data show that very few appeals are ever advanced by Medi-
care HMO enrollees and most of the claims reviewed by the
independent reviewer are affirmed in favor of the HMO.95 It is dif
ficult for enrollees and their families to navigate through the
grievance and appeal process for two reasons. First, it is unlikely
that enrollees even know the process exists. Second, even if they
do, enrollees likely find the process difficult to understand. The
lack of appeals made by enrollees illustrates that Medicare enrol-
lees are not using the grievance and appeals process and that
"weak government oversight has allowed this to persist."94 HMOs
have been able to exploit the combination of vulnerable enrollees
and the lack of HCFA enforcement. HCFA has failed to ensure that
Medicare HMO enrollees understand that they may attempt to
overcome adverse decisions by appealing them. In order to relieve
the difficulties facing Medicare HMO enrollees in advocating for
themselves, it is critical that the grievance and appeal process be
improved.
III. MEDICARE HMO ENROLLEES' DIFFICULTIES REQUIRE AN
ALTERNATE FORM OF HMO REGULATION
Despite the existence of regulations that govern the grievance
and appeal process of Medicare HMOs, "studies by government
and advocacy groups have consistently identified a wide gap be-
tween regulatory standards and actual practices." 95 HCFA has
repeatedly failed to enforce regulations relating to the grievance
and appeal process for Medicare HMO enrollees. 96 Part III.A dis-
cusses the recent litigation prompting HCFA to issue rules to
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 71-92.
94. Stayn, supra note 58, at 1696 n.152.
95. Tracy E. Miller, Center Stage on the Patient Protection Agenda: Grievance and Appeal
Rights, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 90 (1998) (showing that regulations have yet to materialize
into real enforcement from the enrollee's perspective).
96. See supra Part I (discussing regulations for MCOs, including HMOs).
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review an enrollee's appeal more quickly. Part III.B summarizes the
criticisms of HCFA's regulation of the grievance and appeal proc-
esses of Medicare HMOs.
A. HCFA Protests Order to Enforce Medicare HMO
Grievance and Appeal Compliance
A Medicare HMO refused to cover seventy-two year-old Gregoria
Grijalva's nursing-home care after she had been hospitalized for
chronic health problems.97 She never received notice that the
HMO was denying coverage for the nursing home care and her
attorney stated that Grijalva "never knew that there was an appeals
process.9' Grijalva sued HCFA for contracting with HMOs that did
not administer their grievance and appeal process according to the
Medicare Act and regulations developed pursuant to the Act.99 The
suit developed into a class action of "all persons, nationwide, who
were enrolled in Medicare risk-based health maintenance organi-
zations or competitive medical plans during the three years prior
to the filing of [the] lawsuit."'3 0
The plaintiff class sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Sha-
lala (Secretary), for "abdicating her responsibility to monitor
HMOs and to ensure that HMOs provide Medicare covered bene-
fits."' ' The class demanded further that the Secretary "implement
and enforce effective notice, hearing, and appeals procedures for
HMO service denials."102 The court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment and ordered the Secretary to enforce the
service provisions that require Medicare HMOs, under the Due
97. SeeJane Bennet Clark, What If Your Medicare HMO Says 'No'?, KiPLINGER'S PERS.
FIN. MAG., Oct. 1997, at 112, 112.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Grijalva v. Shalala, Civ. No. 93-711 TUC ACM, 1995 WL 523609, at *7 (D. Ariz. July
18, 1995) (ordering certification of the class action). There were two sub-classes. The first
included those persons denied services by an HMO, with or without notice, who presented a
claim to the Secretary by seeking reconsideration of the HMO denial or by filing some other
form of appeal or objection with the HMO, HHS/HCFA, or SSA office and whose claims
were not administratively resolved. The second group included persons who were not given
adequate notice or appeal fights, including those persons whose claims were favorably adju-
dicated by HHS/HCFA. See id.
101. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D. Ariz. 1996), afftd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th
Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999).
102. Id.
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Process Clause, to provide notice when services are denied. 103 The
service provisions require the HMO to hold an expedited hearing
before denying services that could harm an enrollee. 10 4 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order because the Medicare
Act mandates that the Secretary " 'may not enter into a contract...
with an [HMO]"' unless the HMO meets all the requirements un-
der the Act.
The court relied on the extensive documentation of actual ap-
peals presented by the plaintiffs.' °6 The plaintiffs reviewed 570
HMO notices of adverse determinations and analyzed them ac-
cording to the following categories:
1. Readability: 52% of the notices reviewed were illegible,
based primarily on criteria of 12-point type as the recog-
nized minimum print size for readability by elderly
persons.
2. Reason for Denia 74% of the notices provided vague, am-
biguous, nonspecific reasons for denial.
3. Personal Liability: only 41% contained an explanation of
personal liability resulting from care incurred subse-
quent to denial.
4. Appeal Rights- [a] vast majority of the notices provided in-
formation on appeal rights. Ninety-six percent of the
notices included the time frame for appeal; 91% di-
rected claimants on where or with whom to file the
appeal; 73% explained that additional evidence could be
provided; only 10% provided information about Peer
Review Organization (PRO) review.
107
Furthermore, "[i]n 25% of the notices reviewed by Plaintiffs, or in
eight of the ten reviewed by the Court, the HMO failed to inform
the claimant that he or she had a right to present additional evi-
dence to the HMO for reconsideration." 0 The court further found
that the notices did not inform enrollees that they could turn to
103. See id.
104. See id. at 754; see also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
105. Grijalva v, Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395mm(c)(1)), vacated, Grijalva v. Shalala, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999) (vacating the Ninth
Circuit's decision and remanding with instruction that the decision be made in accordance
with American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999), as well as
the relevant statutes and regulations).
106. See Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 757-58.
107. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Volume III Plaintiff's Exhibit C in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, at 2). Yet very few Medicare HMO enrollees know their rights to
appeal. See supra Part II.B.
108. Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 758.
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their physician for support in advocating their position and to de-
velop potential evidence to use in an appeal.°9
Two factors were critical in the court's decision: first, the nega-
tive effect on enrollees resulting from the great length of time
required to resolve appeals; and, second, the lack of notice from
HMOs that an adverse determination had been made. The court
wrote, "[g] iven the length of time it takes for further appeal of the
HMO denial [of service], deprivations [in care] will certainly have
significant impacts on [an enrollee's] quality of life and some may
even be life threatening." "° The court reasoned that to have a
meaningful opportunity to present evidence under the Due Proc-
ess Clause enrollees must have that opportunity within a
reasonable period of time."' Additionally, the court discussed how
Medicare beneficiaries would be especially harmed because many
live near the poverty line; the effect of not receiving the care de-
nied by the HMO would be great for those enrollees because
physical harm or death could result."' On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed, writing that "[t]he mere fact that the enrollee may be
able to go elsewhere and pay for the services herself is of little com-
fort to an elderly, poor patient-particularly one who is ill and
whose skilled nursing care has been terminated without a specific
reason or description of how to appeal."' 3
On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court vacated the
decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the decision to be in
accordance with American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sul-
livan."4 The Court in American Manufacturers held that the statutory
scheme in Pennsylvania that permitted a utilization review commit-
tee to deny workers' compensation claims for health expenses did
not violate due process because the private insurers, who could re-
quest utilization review, were not state actors. "1 The Court stated
that the test of whether the Due Process Clause had been violated
required "both an alleged constitutional deprivation 'caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule
109. See id. (finding also that this violated 42 C.F.R. § 417.618, which requires HMOs to
allow enrollees to present evidence when advancing their appeal).
110. Id. at 759.
111. See id. at 759 (citing Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 164 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
112. See id. at 756-57.
113. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1573
(1999).
114. Grijalva v. Shalala, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999) (remanding with instruction that the de-
cision be made in accordance with American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,
119 S. Ct. 977 (1999), as well as the relevant statutes and regulations).
115. SeeAmerican Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 982 (1999).
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of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State
is responsible,' and that 'the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor., ,,1
The lower courts likely will find that the Due Process clause was
violated in Grijalva. First, a constitutional deprivation exists for
Medicare HMO enrollees when care has been denied. The Court
in American Manufacturers explained that for a Due Process right to
be triggered the plaintiff must have been denied a protected inter-
est in property or liberty.11 7 The Court provided numerous
examples of protected property interests, such as federal welfare
assistance and Social Security benefits."8 Explaining that the work-
ers' compensation benefits provided for only "reasonable" and
"necessary" expenses, the Court reasoned that they were not a pro-
tected interest because, differing from welfare and social security,
they did not entide an employee to the payment of all medical
treatment."9 The receipt of Medicare benefits, including those
from an HMO, is more akin to universal programs such as Social
Security and welfare. For example, all people over the age of sixty-
five have the right to receive specific health care services, such as
emergency care services. These rights to care and for the payment
of these medical treatments, such as emergency care, do not ter-
minate without due process once a Medicare beneficiary chooses
to receive care from an HMO rather then the fee-for-service plan.
Second, on remand, the Medicare HMOs may be held to be
state actors. The American Manufacturers Court overruled the rea-
soning of the Third Circuit that state-mandated benefits provided
by private insurers did not constitute state action.'2° In distinguish-
ing a case where the Court found state action and one in which the
state was constitutionally obligated to provide medical treatment to
injured inmates, the Court explained that the State of Pennsylvania
was not obligated to provide benefits because the legislation placed
the obligation on the employers.'2' As applied to health benefits for
Medicare beneficiaries, the obligation is on the government to pay
for these services. Whether the beneficiary received health care
116. Id. at 985 (citations omitted).
117. See id. at 989 (citing U.S. CONST., amend. XIV and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 332 (1976)).
118. See id. at 990 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Matthews v. Eld-
ridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). The Court stated that the issue, similar to that of HMO
enrollees, is "whether predeprivation notice and a hearing were required before the indi-
vidual's interest in continued payment of benefits could be terminated." American Mfrs., 119 S.
Ct. at 990.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 987-88.
121. See id. (discussing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,54-56 (1988)).
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through the fee-for-service or HMO option, the federal govern-
ment is the payor of those services. Each Medicare HMO receives a
per capita payment for each enrollee. The obligation, therefore, is
on the federal government, as a state actor, to pay for those serv-
ices. In addition, the American Manufacturers Court explained that
state action exists when "the State 'has exercised coercive power or
has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or cov-
ert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State.' 122 In the case of Medicare HMOs, Congress is encouraging
and providing incentives, through the Balanced Budget Act, to
have more Medicare beneficiaries enroll in Medicare HMOs. With
such encouragement by the state to provide Medicare benefits
through Medicare HMOs, it is likely that the lower court will issue
a similar decision that the denial of care by private Medicare
HMOs constitutes state action. Therefore, even though the Su-
preme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, the case will
likely be decided and reasoned on similar grounds on remand.
In practice, Congress and HCFA have created requirements for
Medicare HMOs that require due process for Medicare HMO en-
rollees when care or payment for services is denied. However,
instead of enforcing existing regulations against the non-compliant
Medicare HMOs, the Secretary, somewhat surprisingly, fought the
Grijalva suit.12 3 The Secretary argued that "Medicare enrollees in
HMOs exchanged Medicare appeal rights for expanded
[Medicare] ." 24 Additionally, the Secretary claimed that because
HMOs are private organizations, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply. 25 The district court disa-
greed, finding that the Due Process Clause applied to private entity
decisions, such as those made by hospitals and physicians under
fee-for-service Medicare. 26 The district court ultimately found that
"the Medicare statute, the Secretary's regulations, and the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, unequivocally provide that a
122. American Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 986 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004
(1982)).
123. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 758 (D. Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115
(9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999). This position is surprising because the Sec-
retary would likely want to institute measures that protect consumers rather than leave them
vulnerable.
124. Id. at 753 n.8.
125. See id. at 751 (claiming that private actors, such as HMOs, were not covered by the
Due Process Clause and therefore did not have to provide HMO enrollees with the same
procedural protections that they would receive from government actors).
126. See id. at 752-53 (stating that, although the HMOs were private actors, they pro-
vided government benefits which enrollees had a right to receive and, therefore, were
public actors covered under the Due Process Clause).
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Medicare beneficiary is entitled to notice and hearing when an
HMO denies services based on [organization] determinations.' 2
7
Applying the prior analysis of American Manufacturers, the private
Medicare HMOs are state actors because the federal government is
obligated to pay for the health care costs of Medicare HMO bene-
ficiaries. 2 In violation of the statute and regulations, the court
emphasized that Congress expressly prohibited the Secretary from
entering into arrangements with HMOs that did not meet the
statutory requirements, including the grievance and appeal re-
quirements.' 29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated, "[t]he Secretary
fails to recognize the real problem: Inadequate notice renders the
existence of an appeal process meaningless.",30 Both the district
and appeals courts found that, in addition to violating a Medicare
beneficiary's right to due process, the statute and regulations were
not being enforced by HCFA. The district court listed ten mini-
mum standards for the form and content of the notice and other
requirements for a hearing. 13 A subsequent order of the court
added that the notice must be prompt and that an expedited proc-
ess must be available when services are urgently needed.132 After
the district court granted partial summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs and issued the injunction, the Secretary promulgated new
regulations. 3 3 These new rules permit an enrollee to request an
expedited review for a denied service within seventy-two hours if a
longer wait could jeopardize life or health.'3 4
The Grijalva cases show that HCFA has been both ineffective
and reluctant in enforcing the Medicare HMO regulations as they
pertain to grievance and appeal rights of enrollees. When it be-
comes necessary for enrollees to sue the Secretary to receive their
rights-rights unambiguously provided for under the statute and
regulations-questions arise as to HCFA's effectiveness. These
127. Gijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 755 (footnotes omitted).
128. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text; see also Note, Medicare Managed Care:
A New Constitutional Right to Due Process for Denials of Care Under Grijalva v. Shalala, 28 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 185, 220-23 (1999) (analyzing Grijalva in accordance with American
Manufacturers).
129. See Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 760-61 (stating that HCFA violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395mm (c) (1)).
130. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1573
(1999).
131. See Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 760-61 (stating conditions including minimum point
size for notices and requirements that the notice be prompt).
132. See Grijalva v. Shalala, No. CIV 93-711 TUC ACM, 1997 WL 155392 at *1-*2 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 3, 1997).
133. See Grijalva, 152 F.3d at 1124.
134. See Clark, supra note 97, at 112; supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text
(discussing statutory requirements for expedited review).
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questions include serious concerns about the due process rights of
enrollees, many of whom are unable to advocate effectively for
themselves. These concerns will only grow in importance as Con-
gress continues to encourage Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in
HMOs.
B. Despite Repeated Warnings, HCFA Fails to Regulate the
Grievance and Appeal Process of Medicare HMOs
Many governmental studies and health care advocates have
noted that the Secretary had not effectively enforced the grievance
and appeal laws for Medicare HMOs. The district court accurately
assessed that "HMOs hide the ball" from enrollees when playing
the game of appealing HMO adverse determinations. Commen
tators generally do not endorse the current procedures and the
level of enforcement. 36 Numerous studies by government agencies
and contractors, both before and after the Grijalva decision, have
issued warnings to HCFA, but HCFA took few enforcement ac-
tions.5 7 As a result, an enrollee is unable to combat the powerful
interests of the HMO and encounters difficulty in obtaining infor-
mation regarding the efficacy of an HMO's grievance and appeal
processes when initially choosing an HMO.s'
The GAO has been one of the harshest critics of HCFA's over-
sight of Medicare HMO compliance with the grievance and appeal
requirements.39 According to the GAO, Medicare HMOs often
135. Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 758.
136. See, e.g., Gordon Bonnyman Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate En-
rollee Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 TENN. L. REv. 359, 374 (1998)
("[T]he Medicare HMO appeal process is of practical use only in contesting the retrospec-
tive denial of a claim for services already rendered. Even then, its value is limited due to the
difficulty of persuading a clinician to provide care in the face of HMO's refusal of cover-
age."); Miller, supra note 95, at 91 ("[T]he Medicare experience demonstrates the need for
explicit policies to govern the appeal process and an effective strategy for implementation
and enforcement."). But see Statement ofim Parkel, Member AARP Board of Directors, on Medicare
Appeals, Presented to the Health Subcommittee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, April 23, 1998 (visited Apr. 2, 2000) <http://www.aarp.org/wwstand/testimony/
1998/testparkel.html> [hereinafter Parkel] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) ("On balance, we give the Medicare managed care appeal process high marks.
Compared to what is available in private sector managed care, the Medicare appeal process
remains the gold standard, despite its shortcomings.").
137. See infra Part III.B.
138. See supra Part IIA-B.
139. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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distribute "inaccurate or incomplete benefit information" to their
elderly consumers.' 4°
The GAO recently conducted a study of several HMOs and
found that the benefit materials distributed by sixteen HMOs re-
ported incorrect information regarding the specific services that
the HMO provided and the parties that must approve care.14 ' The
GAO found that many beneficiaries did not receive the required
information when their HMOs denied services or payment for serv-
ices. 142 Often the HMO would give little prior notice when it denied
coverage. 143 In its analysis, the GAO cited previous investigations of
HCFA which found many violations." The GAO reviewed the no-
tices sent to enrollees by the HMO and found them incomplete,
vague, missing, or even never issued. 145 In fifty-three of the seventy-
four CHDR cases that contained the required denial notices, the
notices simply said that the enrollee did not meet the coverage re-
quirements or they contained some other vague reason for the
denial; advocacy groups reported similar concerns to the GAO.'4
When enrollees are presented only with incorrect or vague infor-
mation, they face great difficulty in effectively appealing adverse
organization determinations.
In commenting on Medicare HMOs' failure to administer the
program in a fair manner, the GAO stated that for some HMOs:
140. McGinley, supra note 4, atA4.
141. See Scanlon, supra note 44, at 5-7 (listing as an example the approval necessary to
receive a mammogram).
142. Seeid. at 11.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 11-12. The GAO report further states:
In 1997, HCFA performed monitoring visits to 90 MCOs and about 13 percent of
these MCOs were cited for failing to issue denial notices. In addition, nearly one-
quarter of the 90 MCOs were cited for issuing denial notices that did not adequately
explain beneficiaries' appeal rights. Two studies by the [Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral], using different methodologies, provide additional evidence that beneficiaries
are not always informed of their appeal rights.
Id. (citing DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, PUB. No. OEI-07-94-00283, MEDICARE HMO APPEAL AND GRIEVANCE PROCESSES,
REVIEW OF CASES (1996); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, PUB. No. OEI-07-96-00281, Medicare HMO and Grievance Processes:
Beneficiaries' Understanding (1996)). In one study, the OIG surveyed beneficiaries who
were enrolled or had recently disenrolled from a managed care plan. About 10% said that
their health plans had denied requested services, and of these, 83% of the respondents said
that they had not revived the required notice explaining the denial and their appeal rights.
See id. at 12.
145. See id. at 12 (arguing that "[appeal notifications] contain general, rather than spe-
cific reasons for the denial").
146. See id.
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[The] general practice was to issue the denial notices the day
before the services were discontinued. We found that many
skilled nursing facility [SNF] discharge notices were mailed to
the beneficiary's home instead of being delivered to the facil-
ity. In other cases, it appeared that the beneficiary or his or
her representative received the notice a few days after the
beneficiary had been discharged from the SNF or the SNF
coverage had ended. Ten of the 25 SNF discharge cases we
reviewed at CHDR also involved the receipt of notice after the
patient had been discharged.
47
When HCFA evaluates HMOs for their accuracy of notification
to enrollees when denying treatment, it compares the notices with
plan information that often is incorrect, resulting in HCFA finding
compliance where none exists. 48 Also, HCFA does not generally
check cases where an enrollee did not appeal the denial of services
or reimbursement.
149
Currently. HCFA is developing model literature for grievance
and appeal disclosure information, with completion by the fall of
1999 and testing during 2000.150 Yet it is not clear what the practical
effect of these materials will be. The GAO stated:
To date, however, [HCFA's] policies and practices have fallen
short of [the] mark .... We believe ... that [despite HCFA
initiatives] these problems will not be fully addressed until
HCFA implements our past and current recommendations by
setting information standards for MCOs and requiring them
to adhere to those standards.
5
1
Additionally, the Balanced Budget Act requires HCFA to de-
velop comparative HMO information for consumers, but as of this
147. Id. at 12.
148. See id. at 13. For example, HMOs have informed beneficiaries in their plan's bene-
fits that a mammograrn requires physician approval while this practice is prohibited under
Medicare. See McGinley, supra note 4, at A4.
149. See Scanlon, supra note 44, at 14 (stating further that when the HMO contracts
with other organizations to issue denial and appeal letters, HCFA does not check these ma-
terials and that HCFA only reviews those cases that are appealed and does not investigate
whether an enrollee who is denied services receives notice).
150. See id. at 15. HCFA is developing model literature that may be distributed by HMOs
to enrollees. It is thought that this information will assist enrollees in better understanding
their rights in the grievance and appeal process.
151. Id. at 16.
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writing, consumers must primarily rely upon information distrib-
uted by the HMO.
As for sanctioning HMOs that commit violations of the statutes
and regulations, HCFA has frequently failed to act. In 1995, the
GAO found that HCFA's enforcement actions against Medicare
HMOs were weak.
5 3
When HCFA has documented problems in HMOs that have
been slow to correct deficiencies, it has been reluctant to use
sanctions and other enforcement tools at its disposal. Under
HCFA's enforcement approach, serious improprieties by a few
Medicare HMOs-subjecting beneficiaries to abusive sales
practices, unduly delaying their appeals, or exhibiting pat-
terns of poor quality of care-have taken years to resolve.54
In particular, the GAO found that the appeal process for benefi-
ciaries was unnecessarily slow; beneficiaries who appealed denials
often waited six months or more for resolution.5 5 The GAO wrote:
Although intended to be a beneficial protection against po-
tential underservice by HMOs, the appeal process is too slow
to effectively resolve disputes over services that beneficiaries
believe are urgently needed. Moreover, some HMOs have ex-
tended the process even more by not processing beneficiaries'
appeals within the prescribed time frames. This results in
some beneficiaries returning to fee-for-service Medicare to ob-
tain the services they believe they need, while others remain
in HMOs but incur substantial out-of-pocket expenses with lit-
de certainty of repayment.
Numerous other GAO reports have chronicled HCFA's failure and
issued warnings.
5 7
152. See id. at 1. But see HCFA, Operational Policy Letter, supra note 42 (advising HMOs
how to submit appeals data, but not providing information, such as ALJ claims, beyond ini-
tial determinations).
153. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 2.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 13-14.
157. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-99-92, MEDI-
CARE+CHOICE: NEW STANDARDS COULD IMPROVE ACCURACY AND USEFULNESS OF PLAN
LITERATURE (1999); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-99-68, MEDICARE
MANAGED CARE: GREATER OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO PROTECT BENEFICIARY RIGHTS, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (1999); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-98-
119, HMO COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS: MOST KEY PROCEDURES IN PLACE, BUT OTHERS VAL-
UED BY CONSUMERS LARGELY ABSENT 21 (1998) ("[P]ublicly available data on the number
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Other government agencies and organizations have made simi-
lar recommendations concerning HCFA's failures in this area.
After analyzing the appeal claims HCFA submitted for its review in
1993, the NDG suggested that HCFA should focus corrective action
on dispute-prone areas, improve HMO communications with en-
rollees, and design a national system for benefit denial appeals. 15 8 A
report filed by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) stated that Medicare HMO enrollees cannot obtain medical
services because health plans have limited the ways in which mem-
bers may appeal unfavorable decisions.1 59 June Gibbs Brown,
Inspector General of HHS, said that "many HMOs-more than
half of those examined-did not fulfill federal rules for handling
appeals and grievances. " '60 Furthermore, AARP has recorded cases
where
formal denial is delayed indefinitely or never communicated
to the enrollee, or the reason given for a denial is meaning-
less.... Most enrollees do not know, and are not told, that
they have an absolute right to an expedited appeal if a doctor
says that delay could be medically harmful.
6
'
Weak government oversight by HCFA has allowed these conditions
to persist.
162
Despite such problems, HCFA historically has not employed its
power to sanction Medicare HMOs. Although Congress first pro-
vided HCFA the authority to sanction in 1986, HCFA did not issue
regulations implementing this authority until 1994.163 Because they
were unable to rely on government oversight, private groups have
worked to guarantee higher levels of quality in HMOs, helping to
compensate for HCFA's shortcomings.16
and types of complaints and appeals, if defined and collected in a consistent fashion, could
enhance oversight, accountability, and market competition."); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. No. HRD-92-11, MEDICARE: HCFA NEEDS TO TAKE STRONGER ACTIONS
AGAINST HMOs VIOLATING FEDERAL STANDARDS (1991); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, PUB. No. HRD-88-73, MEDICARE: EXPERIENCE SHOWS WAYS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS (1988).
158. See DAVID RICHARDSON ET AL., NETWORK DESIGN GROUP, INC., STUDY OF COVER-
AGE DENIAL DISPUTES BETWEEN MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES AND HMOs 4-5 (1993).
159. See Federal Report Says HMOs Deny Senior Care, MEDICAL INDUSTRY TODAY, Mar. 19,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, MEDTDY File.
160. Id.
161. Parkel, supra note 136.
162. See Stayn, supra note 58, at 1696 n.152.
163. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 12.
164. See id. at 4.
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In conclusion, HCFA has not ensured that Medicare HMO con-
sumers possess adequate information on how to appeal adverse
HMO determinations and has neglected to act affirmatively to as-
sist enrollees in successfully bringing and winning appeals. Again
and again, HCFA has tried to regulate HMOs in this area and yet
has not improved the situation for enrollees. Another method is
needed because of HCFA's inability or reluctance to protect
consumers and provide them with information. Private non-
governmental organizations offer both a stronger method of
enforcement and better consumer information for Medicare HMO
enrollees.
IV. PRIVATE ACCREDITATION OF THE MEDICARE GRIEVANCE AND
APPEAL PROCESS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
HCFA RULES AND ENFORCEMENT
Based on the current enforcement of the law and regulations for
the protection of Medicare HMO enrollees in the grievance and
appeal process, other forms of regulating the grievance and appeal
process should be explored. These alternatives should take into
account the particular characteristics of the Medicare population.
This Part provides an introduction to this Note's proposed
solution-permitting private accreditation of the grievance and
appeal process for Medicare HMOs. Part 1V.A discusses the goals
that the regulation of the grievance and appeal process should
achieve. Part IV.B outlines several proposed solutions for address-
ing the current problems in the grievance and appeal process. Part
IV.C states the argument for private accreditation of Medicare
HMOs as an alternative to HCFA regulation and introduces some
organizations that may be able to conduct such accreditation.
A. Policy Goals
One of the greatest problems for health care consumers is that
"[they] typically confront providers as individuals-a situation that
usually pits unorganized diverse interests (consumers) against or-
ganized ... interests." 65 Reacting to this concern, Senator Charles
Grassley, chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging,
165. Rodwin, supra note 10, at 1352.
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stated that government oversight must be increased to give the
elderly " 'the tools to choose' the best health plan."1  Enhancing
the typical Medicare HMO enrollee's relative power in relation to
her HMO is a critical part of improving the grievance and appeal
process.
The AARP outlines five key elements necessary for a managed
care appeal process which have general support from many con-
sumer groups and scholars:
1. Speed.... Most treatment decisions should be made
within a few weeks, and some within a few days, or even
hours. [1'7]
2. Notice and opportunity to be heard. [8] .. .
3. Appropriate medical expertise [in making clinical deci-
sions]....
4. Continuity of Care. This is a major concern for enrollees
whose care is about to be terminated or reduced. It
makes no sense to cut back on treatment, or to force a
patient to leave a hospital, and then later decide that this
was an error. In many cases, the care cannot be re-
started, and where it can, the interruption in care may
have caused serious and possibly irreversible harm.
Treatment disputes in these cases should be resolved be-
fore any change in treatment occurs.
5. Outside independent review. ['69] A plan denial of medi-
cal care should be reviewed by someone having no
relation to the plan and no stake in the outcome. Unbi-
ased review is essential in a managed care environment
166. McGinley, supra note 4, at A4.
167. See also Clark, supra note 97, at 114 (explaining that despite the expedited appeal
process, an enrollee, "can ask a doctor outside the network to request an expedited appeal,
but [will] have to pay out of pocket for the consultation and may have to wait up to ten
days-plus the 72 hours-for a decision"); Rother, supra note 10, at 42 ("[T]here is a com-
pelling need to establish an appeals mechanism that can resolve denial treatment problems
quickly and fairly."); Jonathan Gardner, HCFA Speeds Appeals of Denials of Care by Medicare Risk
HMOs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 5, 1997, at 28 (reporting on the newly announced expe-
dited appeal rules).
168. See also Eleanor D. Kinney, Consumer Grievance and Appeal Procedures in Managed Care
Plans, HEALTH LAw.,Jan. 1998, at 17, 20-21.
169. See also Kinney, supra note 168, at 20-21; Miller, supra note 95, at 92-93 (showing
how many states are mandating some type of external review).
Increasing Consumer Power
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
where the health plan's financial incentives may encour-
age saving money over delivery of appropriate, perhaps
expensive, care.170
In addition, other consumer groups suggest that every process
relating to grievance and appeal should somehow assist consumers
in making decisions when choosing an HMO.17' These goals assist
in evalutating the form and oversight of the grievance and appeal
process for Medicare HMOs. The present form of regulation under
HCFA does not meet these objectives because many Medicare
HMO enrollees do not have notice and opportunity to advance
their claims in a timely manner. In addition, enrollees often suffer
interruptions in their care because of denials that force them back
into fee-for-service Medicare.
B. Proposed Solutions
Several organizations advance solutions to better meet the needs
and preferences of Medicare HMO enrollees. However, some or-
ganizations suggest that working within the current framework is
best for enrollees. Unlike the AARP, some groups believe that the
system of enforcing the grievance and appeal regulations does not
require significant change and prefer to continue the current sys-
tem with gradual reform.' 72 The first proposed solution suggests
that although the current situation is not ideal, improvements
could be made by simply codifying the grievance and appeal rights
in greater detail or requiring the passage of mandatory statutory
language or regulatory enforcement. 173 The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has promulgated a model law
that requires contracts between providers and HMOs to explicitly
address grievance procedures 74 and many states have enacted this
170. Parke4 supra note 136.
171. See McGinley, supra note 4, at A4; supra text accompanying note 166.
172. See Park4 supra note 136 ("On balance, we give the Medicare managed care appeal
process high marks. Compared to what is available in private sector managed care, the
Medicare appeal process remains the gold standard, despite its shortcomings.").
173. For examples of federal bills proposed to regulate health care relationships and
ensure the rights of managed care plan enrollees, see H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997) and
H.R. 2967, 105th Cong. (1997).
174. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATION MODEL ACT §8, in MODEL LAwS REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, at 111-385-1
(1995).
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legislation.175 A second alternative, proposed by another commen-
tator, is that the Medicare grievance and appeal process should be
applied uniformly to all HMOs. 76 This proposal is not an effective
option for the elderly that need continuous care, "as the discon-
tinuation of services during the lengthy appeal process is
tantamount to a complete denial. 177 This policy could be poten-
tially quite expensive for the Medicare beneficiary, who would have
to pay for the provided services during the appeal process.
A third way to encourage HMOs to respond to consumer con-
cerns is to allow civil suits for all care determinations that
negatively affect the enrollee. 7 This option is poor for two reasons.
First, it would protect consumers only after they have been denied
care and that denial results in a negative outcome such as perma-
nent disability or death. Such a solution does not promote a
functioning grievance and appeal process for those enrollees who
need prompt resolution of their care decisions. For them, filing a
lawsuit after they sustain an irreparable injury is their only re-
course. Second, except for the ability to determine which HMOs
have been sued, this option would give potential enrollees little
information upon which they can evaluate HMOs. The ability of
Medicare enrollees to search for legal complaints against an HMO
is limited and the process costly.
A fourth proposal dedicates more funding to the advancement
of Medicare appeals and incorporates more professional ombuds-
men.' 79 The authors of a study on grievance and appeal processes
stated, "[i]ntermediaries (such as advocates, senior groups, family
members, and health professionals) can play an important role in
helping beneficiaries to understand their choices. However, the
infrastructure for such outreach is underdeveloped and inade-
quately funded."'80 In Texas, AARP, Families USA, and three
nonprofit HMOs collaborated to develop principles to govern
HMOs and agreed that a consumer ombudsman would help
175. See Stayn, supra note 58, at 1703 n.203.
176. See id.
177. Miller, supra note 95, at 90; see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
178. Currently, in some situations, these suits are preempted by ERISA. See Margaret G.
Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federal-
ism, 23 AM.J.L. & MED. 251, 275 (1997) ("When beneficiaries of ERISA plans sue HMOs for
injuries resulting from the negligence of an HMO-employed physician, their claims are
treated as common law malpractice actions.").
179. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
180. Hibbard et al., supra note 53, at 191.
Increasing Consumer Power
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
enrollees navigate their plans.81 The Medicare Beneficiaries' De-
fense Fund (MBDF), a New York based advocacy group, wants to
serve permanently as an advocate for HMO enrollees, evaluate the
performance of HMOs, respond to telephone queries, and report
on the kinds of problems members experience in different
HMOs. 82 This approach assumes that adequate funding exists for
these programs and that consumer organizations exist to step into
these areas. This, however, is not the case: funding is short, and
consumer groups are understaffed and have few resources.
Each of the above proposals works within the current regulation
and enforcement of grievance and appeal regulations. One com-
mentator wrote that "[m]ost regulatory schemes impose uniform
industry-wide rules that affect consumers across the board"'83 and
therefore provide a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach. But simply
applying changes in statutory or regulatory language will not repair
the inherent flaws in the current system of regulation. Consumers
of health care "have diverse interests, needs, abilities, and val-
ues."184 Medicare recipients comprise a special group which needs
its own advocates, such as private accreditors, to play an active role
in designing HMO rules, ensuring HMO compliance with the
grievance and appeal process, providing information to consumers,
and advocating in individual cases.
C. Private Accreditation Provides Pre-Enrollment Information on
HMOs and Empowers Enrolled Consumers in the Design and
Operation of an HMO's Grievance and Appeal Process
1. Arguments for Private Accreditation of Medicare HMOs-
Congress and HCFA should seek to bring consumer interests to-
gether to counter the size, specialization, and resources of the
HMOs. Only in this way can the elderly be sufficiently protected in
the Medicare HMO arena. A successful solution must "create insti-
tutions that help consumers organize or pool resources, expertise,
purchasing power, information, or professional assistance. "'e Pri-
vate accreditation as an alternative form of compliance to the
181. See TDoA Gives Qualified Support to HMOs' Move Toward National Standards, PR
Newswire, Sept. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, Insurance Library, General News & Informa-
tion Library, PR NEWSWIRE File.
182. See Rodwin, supra note 10, at 1354-55.
183. Id. at 1374.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1353.
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HCFA regulations will better serve the Medicare HMO enrollees as
well as assist HCFA in developing higher quality standards for the
industry.
The proposals mentioned previously' 86 fail to encourage or allow
non-governmental organizations to play a significant role in the
design of rules for and the supervision of HMOs, thereby denying
beneficiaries power. The consumer-oriented goals of a fast process
that allows the individual to be heard without an interruption in
care can be better addressed in an environment that allows private
bodies to create alternative forms of regulation. Proposals for ad-
vocating the creation of an ombudsman address some of the
current problems but require significant resources to enact. The
ombudsman program also works within the current form of regula-
tion and does not promote alternative solutions that may better
meet the goals of the regulations. Additionally, as evidenced by the
nursing home experience, even with an ombudsman to monitor
providers, significant quality of care concerns remain.
1 87
Because HCFA has been reluctant to enforce Medicare HMO
regulations and other proposals contain flaws that render them
ineffective, Congress should enact legislation that permits
Medicare HMOs to submit to private accreditation by government-
certified accreditation bodies to satisfy federal requirements
governing the grievance and appeal process. Private accreditation
is the best way to protect those in Medicare who are denied care.
Voluntary private accreditation allows the HMO to choose between
standard government regulation under HCFA and the standards of
government-approved private accrediting bodies. This Note argues
that voluntary private accreditation will improve compliance and
will increase the power of Medicare HMO enrollees. '88
Bodies that accredit health care providers are independent or-
ganizations that provide their approval as long as the health care
provider meets the accrediting body's standards. Private accredita-
tion serves two main purposes. First, it defines standards that
186. See infra Part IV.B.
187. SeeJennifer L. Williamson, The Siren Song of the Elderly: Forida's Nursing Homes and
the Dark Side of Chapter 400, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 423, 426-27 (1999) (showing how regulations
may have helped in some areas while at the same time significant abuses of the rights of
nursing home residents occurred).
188. For a discussion of the advantages of self-regulation through a non-governmental
entity, see generally Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regu-
latoiy Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1995) (analyzing advantages and disadvantages of
audited self-regulation and private accreditation and concluding that this can be an effective
regulatory scheme).
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establish and measure quality; second, it determines whether the
organizations seeking accreditation have met those standards.
18 9
There are many secondary benefits to private accreditation. The
public costs of enforcement are reduced and those organizations
seeking approval bear the costs of the accreditation process.' 90 In
addition, the accreditation organization "can develop superior
knowledge of the subject when compared with the government
agency, and self-regulation [involving private accreditation] allows
for more diversity in methods of compliance with legal rules than a
government agency can provide."' 9' Voluntary private accreditation
may result in better compliance because the organization chooses
to be regulated in that particular manner. 92 Also, voluntary private
accreditation gives more information to consumers.9 3 This allows
payors and consumers to make choices about HMOs in a shorter
period of time and requires less investigation. Finally, private ac-
creditation can be more flexible and innovative, allowing HMOs to
meet their statutory obligations in a number of ways. Current
command and control regulation dictates that only one method
can be used to meet the regulatory requirements 9  Under that
design, the regulated entity must fulfill specific requirements and
even though superior, or less costly methods could meet or exceed
the goals of regulation, it is not permitted to take such action.
189. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government Regula-
tion in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1994, at 47, 49 (1994).
190. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and
a New System Ethos, 43 ViLL. L. REv. 361, 396-97 (1998). For example, the monitoring costs
that would be borne by HCFA could be passed on to the Medicare HMO because they would
pay a fee to the accrediting body, resulting in less costs to the government.
191. Id. at 397; see also Kinney, supra note 189, at 72 ("Private accreditors, independent
of a regulatory role in government public health insurance programs, would have greater
flexibility to conceptualize quality of care in innovative ways and possibly develop better
quality standards for the health care institutions they accredit. In so doing, they would have
great potential to promote pluralism, diversity, and competition among health care institu-
tions and thus greater consumer choice in a changing health care environment."). In
contrast to applying a regulatory scheme that requires all HMOs to meet the regulations by
similar means, private accrediting bodies can allow HMOs to meet the same outcomes by
various means, resulting in more flexible regulations.
192. See Furrow, supra note 190, at 397 (noting that self-enforcement is more readily ac-
cepted by the regulated entities).
193. See Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword: The Place of Private Accrediting Among the Instru-
ments of Government, LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 1, 5 (1994) ("[Voluntary
private accreditation] can be highly valued as a response to the information deficits that
inevitably plague consumers shopping for complex goods or services.").
194. See Furrow, supra note 190, at 397. "The actual operation of private accreditation
... is more responsive and more complex than simple government regulation would be." Id.
at 399.
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Private accreditation raises legitimate concerns. First, some ob-
servers question whether accrediting bodies can remain
independent in the face of their reliance on accreditation fees paid
by HMOs. 9 5 Second, the accreditation process may be ineffective if
the health care body being accredited can predict which parts of
the operation will be reviewed by the accrediting body and thus
only complies in those areas. 96 Third, the accrediting bodies likely
would be limited in their ability to investigate complaints because
they would not carry the power of legal sanction. Fourth, the ac-
crediting bodies would not be publicly accountable.9  Finally,
arguments have been made that accreditation sometimes results in
certification decisions that do not assure quality. 98
Some of these concerns, including those regarding the regular-
ity of inspection and the failure to achieve quality, can be levied at
the current public authorities that regulate health care. Even
though the private accrediting bodies would receive fees, their
long-term ability to receive the fees and the ability to certify the
grievance and appeal process of HMOs would be dependent on
maintaining government support. The most serious concern is that
private accrediting bodies may not have the same ability to investi-
gate complaints. In that case, the organizations must seek to deter
improper HMO behavior, either by threatening to sanction HMOs
by releasing negative information, or by revoking an HMO's certi-
fication, even if only done temporarily.
Despite these concerns, the payors of health care services, such
as corporations, often use private accreditation to judge HMOs.99
For example, health insurers and those employers offering benefit
plans look to accreditation organizations to ensure that they are
purchasing high quality services and that the covered services are
actually provided to enrollees.2l Similarly, Congress has viewed pri-
vate accreditation as a way to guarantee quality for Medicare
services; for example, Congress wanted to begin the Medicare pro-
gram for hospital care quickly and utilized a private organization to
195. See id. at 397.
196. See id. at 397-98.
197. See id. at 398. Unlike the government which can wield legal sanctions, private ac-
creditation lacks the same enforcement tools. The private accrediting body, however, can
withhold the accreditation label which could jeopardize the health care provider's business
and force them to be subjected to HCFA regulation.
198. See id. at 398-99; see also Kinney, supra note 189, at 71 (pointing out that the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the predominant private ac-
creditation entity for allopathic health care organizations, has not been a quality standard
development leader).
199. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
200. See Kinney, supra note 189, at 55.
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accredit hospitals.20 ' Despite the weaknesses identified above, vol-
untary private accreditation provides the clearest information to
consumers and best seeks to improve the quality of the organiza-
tions it accredits.
2. Organizations with the Potential to Accredit HMOs-Private ac-
crediting bodies certify that HMOs meet quality standards as
defined by the bodies. Accreditation is not required by government
agencies, but some private organizations require their health plans
to be certified by specific agencies. Accreditation is voluntary be-
cause the HMO chooses to submit to the review and investigation
of the accrediting body. There are five major private accrediting
bodies that play a role in the accreditation of standards for the
managed care industry. The National Committee for Quality As-
surance (NCQA), which accredits managed care organizations, and
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (JCAHO), which accredits hospitals and other health care
providers, are the most nationally prominent accreditors in the
area of managed care.02 These two bodies "are concerned about
consumer protection issues and require [HMOs] to specify patient
rights and responsibilities."
20 3
JCAHO has been the predominant accrediting body since the
1950s. °4 JCAHO initially accredited only hospitals, but now also
accredits psychiatric and rehabilitation facilities0 5 and home health
agencies.2l With JCAHO accreditation, a hospital "shall be deemed
to meet" the Medicare requirements. 207 JCAHO accredits, inspects,
and issues warnings as to quality concerns and can hear informal
appeals from hospitals stemming from a denial of accreditation or
findings of deficiencies. °s JCAHO has an advantage over the gov-
201. SeeJUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE
7-32 (1997) (stating that the JCAHO was important in the decision to pass Medicare be-
cause it could assemble the resources quickly to assure quality among the nation's hospitals);
Kinney, supra note 189, at 55.
202. See Furrow, supra note 190, at 396-99. Other organizations that accredit HMOs are:
the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC), which focuses on
ambulatory care delivery entities; the Utilization Review Accreditation Commission (URAC);
and The Medical Quality Commission (TMQC), which primarily surveys medical groups in
California and individual practice associations that provide care in a capitated or prepaid
setting.
203. Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 Am.
J.L. & MED. 301, 319 (1996).
204. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private
Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REv. 835,851-60 (1983).
205. See Kinney, supra note 189, at 52.
206. See id. at 54.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (2) (B) (1994).
208. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.3-.5 (1998).
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ernment because it is not subject to the federal rulemaking process
and can issue new rules each year. 2°9 However, there has been a
significant amount of commentary on JCAHO," ° and some have
argued that JCAHO should be more vigorous in investigating defi-
cient quality of hospitals.' JCAHO, as well as other private
accrediting bodies, must balance the concerns of both the buyers
and the sellers of health care, resulting in better efforts to judge
quality. 2
NCQA began accrediting managed care organizations, among
them HMOs, in 1991.213 NCQA's Board includes corporate repre-
sentation, such as General Electric Corp., General Motors Corp. as
well as other diverse interests including the AARP, Kaiser Founda-
tion Health Plan, Inc., Aetna US Healthcare, and the United Food
and Commercial Workers International Union.1 4 The board's
composition shows that it is not dominated by managed care inter-
ests. Many companies, including UPS, Procter & Gamble, GE,
Ameritech, Ford, and IBM request or require NCQA accreditation
for their employees' health plans.1 5
NCQA accreditation appears to be valued by so many businesses
because of its sensitivity to factors that payors and users of HMOs
find important. A substantial part of NCQA's HMO rating depends
upon customer service.1 6 Illustrating how private accreditation can
be sensitive to consumer needs, an HMO with deficient treatment
of enrollees and a non-functioning grievance and appeal process
will find NCQA accreditation more difficult to obtain. For exam-
ple, one of NCQA's accrediting categories is "Access and
Service." 21 7 This category asks: "Do health plan members have ac-
cess to the care and service they need? ... Do patients report
problems getting needed care? How well does the health plan
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follow up on grievances?" 28 This category constitutes 40% of a
health plan's overall score. 2 9 The other NCQA categories include
"Qualified Providers" (20%), "Staying Healthy" (15%), "Getting
Better" (10%), and "Living with Illness" (15%).220 Through a con-
tract with HCFA, NCQA is conducting the Health Plan Employer
and Data Information Set® (HEDIS®) Health of Seniors Survey
(HOS) to study how health plans improve or maintain the func-
tioning of Medicare beneficiaries.22' One of the strengths of this
approach to accreditation is the focus on the perspective of the
enrollee as a major part of the accreditation process. These ques-
tions and priorities address the goals outlined in Part IV.A. For
example, they attempt to create a system that responds quickly to
consumers and maintains the continuity of care provided to con-
sumers. NCQA is a rigorous inspector. Only 40% of plans receive a
three year accreditation, 35% receive a one year approval, 8% are
accredited provisionally, and 11% are denied. 2 If private accredi-
tation was permitted as a way for HMOs to meet the HCFA
standards, the criteria would likely need to be altered slightly to
address the particular needs of Medicare HMO enrollees, but the
focus on the needs of enrollees is an important factor in increasing
the power of enrollees and designing the system to address their
interests.
In addition to organizations that have existing accreditation
programs for Medicare HMOs, there are many others that could
develop more expansive programs.223 Some, such as MBDF, have
volunteered to become Medicare HMO ombudsmen.224 Others,
such as AARP, have significant resources, or funding for other con-
sumer initiatives, to develop a consumer-oriented accreditation
process.225 Currently, AARP certifies particular health plans for its
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extensive membership. 6 In short, several private organizations ex-
ist that could competently serve as government-certified private
accreditation bodies for the grievance and appeal process of Medi-
care HMOs. Numerous private organizations have experience in
this area and could create a framework for accrediting Medicare
HMOs and monitoring their ability to meet standards that seek to
address the concerns of Medicare enrollees.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD PASS LEGISLATION PERMITTING
VOLUNTARY PRIVATE ACCREDITATION OF MEDICARE
HMOs FOR THE GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCESS
TO MEET FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
Private accreditation can be applied to other aspects of managed
care organizations, or even all managed care operations, but this
Note limits its discussion to how private accreditation will benefit
consumers by providing a better grievance and appeal structure.
Based on the current inadequate level of HCFA oversight and the
unrealized potential of private accreditation bodies, Congress and
HCFA should allow Medicare HMOs to seek private accreditation
in lieu of HCFA regulation and approval for the grievance and ap-
peal process. This proposal would permit HCFA to certify private
agencies to accredit this aspect of managed care organizations.
This procedure would be similar to that currently followed by
hospitals: a hospital may choose either to be accredited and re-
viewed by the JCAHO or to be evaluated under the HCFA
standards. Applied to HMOs, this proposal would not foreclose
HCFA oversight; managed care organizations and their grievance
and appeals processes would still be subject to the oversight of
HCFA, but HMOs could be certified to receive Medicare payments
by choosing to be privately accredited by a federally approved or-
ganization.
Adopting a voluntary private accreditation process would have
two positive effects. First, allowing private accreditation bodies to
determine whether Medicare HMOs meet the Medicare Act's and
regulations' requirements for grievance and appeal processes
would provide consumers with signals as to how they will be treated
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if the HMO renders an adverse organization determination. For
example, the Continuing Care Accreditation Commission (CCAC),
although not focused on managed care entity, accredits Continu-
ing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs) that serve various
health care needs of older Americans. 7 An evaluator of the CCAC
explained that it has "the potential to improve significantly the in-
formation available to consumers.... [A] consumer's choice
between two otherwise apparently comparable CCRCs should be
made significantly easier if one carries the industry's seal of ap-
proval and the other does not."2 8 In practice, this accreditation
gives cues to consumers that, if applied to HMOs, could assist
Medicare enrollees in deciding which HMO to join.
Accreditation, therefore, would inform consumers about the
operations of the plan's grievance and appeal process and assist
the elderly in understanding how various HMOs differ in quality.
Especially for the poor and disabled elderly, who have been shown
to know the least about managed care, 229 accreditation can make
their choices easier by increasing available information and de-
creasing search costs of researching individual HMOs. Optional
private accreditation will encourage HMOs to compete for enrol-
lees by seeking accreditation labels and this competition will result
in better service for Medicare HMO enrollees. Higher-quality
HMOs will earn labels that will illustrate that they have met the
presumably high standard of the private accrediting bodies. Infe-
rior HMOs will avoid the process and lose business because they
will not be able to attain the accreditation.
More HMOs will seek this regulation for the "reputation" effect
of ensuring quality and consumer friendliness to their grievance
and appeal rights, but, additionally, it will result in more flexible
regulatory standards. The private accrediting bodies can regulate
through more outcome-based regulations that may result in more
creative solutions to meet the needs of consumers than under
HCFA currently. Since the process is voluntary, HMOs will likely
seek private accreditation since it may be more constructive in ad-
dressing the legal requirements of Medicare HMOs' grievance and
227. The CCAC was developed by the American Association of Homes and Services for
the Aging (AAHSA), the largest organization of non-profit health care providers devoted to
providing services to the elderly. One of the goals in developing CCAC was to develop high
quality standards for CCRCs that may not be realized under standard regulatory techniques.
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appeals processes than the procedure under HCFA. Once private
accreditators are allowed to certify the grievance and appeal proc-
ess, those Medicare HMOs that can meet the higher standards will
likely choose private accreditation.
As a result, more Medicare HMOs will be driven, through com-
petition for the accreditation labels, to comply with federal
regulations. This will permit HCFA, currently burdened by the pre-
sent caseload, to focus its efforts on those HMOs that do not meet
the more consumer-oriented standards, hopefully reducing the
number of HMOs that currently do not meet federal law and
threaten the health and rights of Medicare HMO enrollees. Thus,
a byproduct of this proposal is that it will increase the effectiveness
of HCFA.
Second, some accrediting groups could impose additional re-
quirements that are targeted specifically to the elderly, or become
advocates for elderly patients. Accrediting groups could also serve
as a complaint center and mediate disputes between an enrollee
and her HMO.2 3 Furthermore, the accreditation groups will be
more familiar with the best way to phrase notices and administer a
program that is most compatible with the different needs of elderly
consumers. This will result in a more flexible and creative regula-
tory approach.
Many payors of health care have not perceived HCFA regulation
and compliance as providing adequate assurances of quality when
it comes to choosing which health plans they should offer their
employees. Instead, these employers and health insurance compa-
nies are developing and relying upon private accreditation
systems.23" ' As stated by the GAO, HCFA's lack of enforcement has
not had a greater negative impact largely because private accredita-
tion efforts have developed quickly. 32 The growth of accreditation
in the private sector is due to private groups' focus on different
criteria than the federal government, specifically those criteria fa-
vored by corporate payors such as high quality service for users and
value for their money. The U.S. government, as a major payor of
Medicare expenses, should follow the private sector and insist on
higher standards for its beneficiaries.
Private accreditation is not a substitute for all government regu-
lation. This Note does not argue that HCFA should scale back any
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statutes or regulations. Current regulations and HCFA enforce-
ment must remain in place because private accreditation is only an
alternative to standard government regulation. Because the federal
government is the single largest payor of health care services and
HCFA plays a large role in implementing the Medicare program,
HCFA should remain as an alternative to accredit and monitor
HMOs. Indeed, an HMO might seek certification from multiple
bodies, signaling to consumers that the HMO will meet the re-
quirements of any accrediting body because of its higher standards
in the area of grievance and appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Note suggests a way to strengthen the Medicare HMO
grievance and appeal process in order to empower consumers. Be-
cause Congress is anxious to move more Medicare beneficiaries
into HMOs, it should take a cue from a previous Congress that in-
corporated private accreditation for hospitals when great numbers
of Medicare beneficiaries entered the private hospital system.233
This Note does not recommend a specific organization to assume
the role of accrediting the grievance and appeal process for Medi-
care HMOs. The decision as to which groups to use and the
requirements of what expertise and resources those groups should
have in developing consumer-oriented programs of accreditation
should be left to Congress. Current HCFA regulation has not im-
proved the condition of Medicare enrollees. To provide better
consumer information and increased compliance, Congress should
create a permissive private accreditation system for the internal
grievance and appeal programs of Medicare HMOs. Allowing
Medicare HMOs to meet the goals of regulations through alterna-
tive means will serve to address the concerns of Medicare enrollees
and provide a more responsive grievance and appeal process.
233. See FEDER, supra note 201, at 7-32 and accompanying text.
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